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I. INTRODUCTION

Orphan works are photographs, motion pictures, musical compositions,
and other creative works whose owners cannot be located. Since the
adoption of both the 1976 Copyright Act1 and the Berne Convention
Implementation Act,2 which eliminated registration, notice, and other
formalities for copyright protection, the number of orphan works has
increased dramatically. In fact, most copyrighted works today are
orphans.' This creates a problem for potential users of these works who
have no way of knowing first, whether a work is still under copyright
protection requiring permission for use, and second, how to contact the
copyright owner to obtain permission.4 This can have a potentially stifling
effect on the creation of new works, thereby harming a key function of
copyright law.5

1. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101.
2. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
3. See Report on Orphan Works, A Report of the Registrar of Copyrights (Jan. 2006)
[hereinafter Report], available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan; Comment of Creative
Commons & Save the Music, at 13 (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter Creative Commons Comment],
availableat http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0643-STM-CreativeCommons.pdf.
4. For examples of potential users having difficulty finding a copyright owner, see, e.g.,
Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Center for Social Media, Untold Stories: Creative
Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers, available at

http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/index.htm; see also Scott Carlson, Whose Work Is It,
Anyway?, at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v5l/i47/47a0330 1.htm.
5. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03(A) (1976) ("The primary
purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to secure 'the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors."' (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519
.(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts.").
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Congress has recently recognized this problem and commissioned the
Copyright Office to conduct a study of orphan works and potential
solutions to the problem. 6 Soon after, the Copyright Office issued a Notice
of Inquiry7 soliciting responses from the public on orphan works issues
and proposed remedies. After receiving nearly 850 responses and
conducting three days of roundtable discussions, the Copyright Office
released a report outlining the problem and proposing a legislative
solution.8 Scholars have also proposed solutions including forfeiture of
copyright protection for orphan works, expansion of the fair use defense
to copyright infringement, reinstitution of copyright formalities, formation
of copyright registries, compulsory licensing, and limitations on remedies
for infringement of works classified as orphans. Texas Congressman
Lamar Smith has introduced a bill aimed at solving the orphan works
problem as well.9 While scholars, legislators, and others disagree as to the
best solution, all agree that orphan works pose a threat to the objectives of
copyright and further study of a viable solution is warranted.
Part II of this Article describes the orphan works problem including its
sources, ramifications, and what is required of a viable solution. Part Ill
analyzes a number of proposed solutions, including those of copyright
scholars and congressional legislation. Part IV proposes a solution that
includes: (1) a reasonable efforts search requirement; (2) the establishment
of a voluntary registry of copyrighted works; and (3) a judicial
presumption that submission of a work into the registry would preclude the
work from being classified as an orphan. Copyright owners who register
their works would have the benefit of a presumption which assumes that
any reasonable search of the registry would have turned up information on
the copyright owner. The presumption would incentivize registration of
works by copyright owners, thereby lowering search and transaction costs
for potential users. Bridging the information gap between copyright

6. See Report, supra note 3; Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch & Patrick Leahy to
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights (Jan. 5, 2005) (showing interest in the subject and
requesting that the Copyright Office undertake a review of the issue); see also Letter from
Congressman Lamar Smith to Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights (Jan. 7, 2005); Letter from
Congressman Howard L. Berman to Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights (Jan. 10, 2005) (all
letters on file with the author).
7. Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3739-43 (Jan. 26, 2005).
8. Report, supranote 3; Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Senators
Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy (Jan. 23, 2006).
9. Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006). The legislation was
withdrawn from the 109th Congress, but is likely to be reintroduced by Congressman Lamar Smith
in the 110th Congress. See Status of the Orphan Works Bill, at http://www.asmp.org/news/spec
2006/orphanupdate.php.
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owners and potential users would lead to negotiation and voluntary
licensing, making this solution preferable to others proposing forfeiture of
copyright protection, compulsory licensing, or limited remedies. In
addition to helping alleviate the orphan works problem, a properly indexed
and searchable registry would also aid in the preservation of copyrighted
works for use by subsequent generations, making this solution optimal and
in line with the objectives of copyright law.
II. NATURE OF THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM
A. The Orphan Works Problem Generally
The Copyright Act of 1976 vests exclusive rights in copyright owners,
including the right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly
display the copyrighted work, and to prepare derivative works.'" Any
subsequent use of a copyrighted work therefore requires permission from
its owner. Potential users will normally contact owners and request a
licensed use to avoid possible liability for copyright infringement.
Orphan works are those for which the rightsholder cannot be located
after a reasonable search in good faith. 1 When an owner is not found, a
potential user cannot know with certainty whether use without permission
will lead to liability for infringement. Herein lies the orphan works
problem: a potential user who fails to find a copyright owner cannot
determine whether the owner has abandoned the work or would disapprove
of the potential use. 2 This distinction is important to potential users
because it determines the risk involved in using a work without
permission.
The risk of incorporating a copyrighted work in a new work is
sometimes too great for a potential user. The result is a chilling effect
where potential users abandon projects, thereby depriving the public of a
new, creative work. Large numbers of copyrighted, yet no longer
valuable, 3 works go unused despite the fact that their owners would no

10. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
11. See Jerry Brito & Bridget Dooling, An Orphan Works Affirmative Defense to Copyright
Infringement Actions, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 75, 77 (2005).
12. Creative Commons Comment, supra note 3, at 12.
13. Owners who are difficult to find are presumably not receiving payment for use of their
works. This means the works are of little or no monetary value to their owners.

COPYRIGHTORPHAN WORKS: A MULTI-PRONGED SOLUTION

longer object to their use.' 4 This "chilling effect" is disproportionate to the
benefit conferred on the few unknown copyright owners who would
actually disapprove of the use of their works.' 5
The "chilling effect" is especially felt by small-scale users and
organizations such as archives and libraries. 6 Small-scale users may not
have the knowledge or access to legal advice to conduct an owner search, 7
and at the same time may not be able to afford the risk of having to bear
the cost of litigation if use is made and an objecting owner surfaces. 8 As
for large-scale users such as libraries and archives, the greater probability
of search failure in a number of instances could result in abandonment of
large preservation and archiving efforts altogether. 9 Without some sort of
legal cover for organizations to archive and preserve, works could be lost
and the public would be deprived of the benefit of such works.
B. The Problem of Missing Markets
The orphan works problem is often described as a missing market form
of market failure. An efficient market may exist between a copyright
owner and a potential user, but because of a lack of information and
prohibitive search costs, neither the owner nor the potential user are able
to find one another to negotiate a permissive use. 2' What results is the
market inefficiency of unfulfilled demand for use of works. 2

14. See Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. C-04-1127, 2004 WL 2663157, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19,
2004) ("[A] vast number of copyrighted yet no longer commercially valuable works sit idle rather
than enriching public knowledge.") (citing CTEA, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 98).
15. Creative Commons Comment, supra note 3, at 12.
16. Id.
17. See Notice of Inquiry ("many potential users of orphan works, namely individuals and
small entities, may not have access to legal advice on these issues and cannot fully assess risk
themselves").
18. See id. ("[tihey may not be able to afford any risk of having to bear the cost of defending
themselves in litigation").
19. Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes for the
Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 276-77 (2006) ("Uncertain legal standing for making
copies, even for preservation purposes, discourages libraries from engaging in the venture at all.
[A] significant probability of failed searches on a cumulative level would lead a library to abandon
digitization efforts of both orphan works and works where the owner is identifiable.").
20. See, e.g., Dennis W.K. Khong, Orphan Works, A bandonwareandtheMissing Marketfor
CopyrightedGoods, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFo TECH. 54, 63 (2007).
21. See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Copyright Term Extension and Orphan Works 1, 6 (Aug. 29,
2006) ("Imagine the difficulties in trying to find the copyright owners for old photographs. The
transactions costs of such rights clearance can be prohibitive."), available at http://www.ischool.
berkeley.edu/-hat/Papers/2006/copyright-policy.pdf.
22. Khong, supra note 20, at 63-64.
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The reasons for this lack of information are numerous.2 3 Most prevalent
is the 1976 Copyright Act which changed copyright law from a regime
which required registration, notice, and other formalities for copyright
protection to a more expansive regime that protects a work at the time
creative expression is fixed in any tangible medium of expression. 4
Therefore, even works that are not registered and that lack any identifying
information are protected. The lack of mandatory registration, notice, and
other formalities deprives potential users of reliable tools to determine a
work's ownership information.
Adding to the problem is the extension of the copyright term.2 5 A
longer copyright term means works are kept out of the public domain,
preventing their use without permission, for a longer period of time. A
longer term also means that searches have to be conducted for a longer
time period, increasing total search costs and allowing for a greater chain
of assignments, bankruptcies, and other difficulties in tracking down the
owner of a work and requesting permission for use. 26 This may prevent use
of a work even when an author no longer has any objection to its use.27
C. Types of Copyrighted Works Affected
The orphan works problem extends to many different types of creative
works including written works, motion pictures, and musical works. But
the works most affected are photographs and illustrations. Unlike most
other works, photographs are rarely published with credit to the author,28
and therefore nearly 99.9% ofphotos processed each year by organizations
such as the Photo Marketing Association become orphaned.29 Photographs
are also particularly vulnerable to the loss of identifying information once

23. For an in depth discussion of some of the sources of the orphan works problem, see
Huang, supra note 19, at 268-77; see also Tobe Leibert, Features-The Problem ofOrphan Works,
at http://llrx.com/features/orphanworks.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
25. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, S. 505, 105th Cong. § 102 (1999).
26. See Brito & Dooling, supranote 11, at 79; see also Hannibal Travis, Building Universal
DigitalLibraries:An Agenda for CopyrightReform, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 806 (2006) ("Finding
the current address or descendants of an author is 'extremely difficult,' and corporate assignments
and bankruptcies frequently leave 'no clear title to works."').
27. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 804 (2003).
28. See generally Report, supra note 3; Reply Comment of Professional Photographers of
America, at 3 (Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter PPA Comment].
29. July 26, 2005 Orphan Works Roundtable, at 19 [hereinafter July 26 Roundtable],
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/0726LOC.PDF.
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the work is disseminated by the author.3" Infringers may simply remove
the copyright notice or other relevant information from the photograph.
Photographers groups have been the most vocal in opposing solutions
which would negatively affect the right to sue for copyright infringement
or to be eligible for the full range of remedies. 3 ' Therefore, any solution to
the orphan works problem must account for the unique situation of
photographs and illustrations with regard to loss of identifying information
and propensity for orphanhood.
D. Requirements of a Viable Solution
Considering the nature and sources of the orphan works problem, a
proper solution should have some key characteristics. The Copyright
Office Report explains that any solution should have three main
objectives: (1) finding the copyright owner; (2) permitting specific users
to make use of works; and (3) efficiency.32 Any solution should have as its
ultimate objective solving the market inefficiency and bringing copyright
owners and potential users together.3 3 Solutions which merely attempt to
allow potential users to use works without permission, and do nothing to
actually bridge the market gap, are not adequate. The solution to the
problem lies in reducing search and transaction costs to create a voluntary
licensing scheme where copyright owners and potential users can
efficiently negotiate a licensed use in a true market.34
Of course, an efficient market solution cannot be created in every
circumstance and there must be a portion of the solution which recognizes
this and allows some uses even when an owner cannot be located. But it
is important to acknowledge that this must only be a secondary solution.35

30. PPA Comment, supranote 28, at 4.
31. See, e.g., id.
32. Report, supra note 3, at 8.
33. Id. at 93 ("[A]ny system to deal with orphan works should seek primarily to make it more
likely that a user can find the relevant owner in the first instance, and negotiate a voluntary
agreement...").
34. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485,502 (2004)
("Because licensing is efficient, intellectual property policy generally seeks to encourage it. Of
course, licensing will be more prevalent if the transaction costs of negotiating a license are low
).

..

35. See Report, supra note 3, at 74-75:
An unspoken assumption in essentially all of the comments was that an orphan
works provision is a second-best solution for a situation in which a voluntary,
market transaction is not possible. Improving the means by which users and
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Use without permission must only be allowed after enough has been done
to actually enable potential users to locate and negotiate with copyright
owners. Therefore, the solution must come in a two step approach
including: (1) reduction of clearance costs by providing potential users
more effective tools for locating information regarding copyright
ownership; and (2) a fallback provision whereby even those potential users
who could not locate copyright owners may sometimes nonetheless use the
work and be provided some legal cover. Such a solution would ease the
burden on potential users whether the work involved turns out to be
orphaned or not."
III. ANALYSIS

OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. DeterminingOrphanhood
1. Reintroduction of Copyright Formalities
At least one scholar has argued for the reintroduction of copyright
formalities which would help alleviate the orphan works problem.37
Reintroduction ofregistration, notice, renewal, and other formalities would
close the information gap and allow users greater access to owner
information. Professor Christopher Sprigman argues for formalities that
are nominally voluntary, but are de facto mandatory for any rightsholder
wishing to extract commercial value from of a work.3" Noncompliance
with the formalities would result in a perpetual default license with
royalties set at a very low level.39 The idea would be that failure to comply
with a formality would result in such low default license rates that the
work would essentially be moved into the public domain.4"
owners can actually negotiate, and thus reducing the number of orphan works to
which any provision would apply, was therefore a very widely agreed goal.
See also July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 56 ("The purpose is not to enable users to use works
without permission of the copyright owners. It is to try to facilitate getting the users and the
copyright owners together so that they can reach an agreement upon the use of a work.").
36. Huang, supra note 19, at 272 ("[A] reduction in the monetary and transaction costs of
conducting a search ... could help to alleviate disillusionment with copyright licensing for all
users, regardless if the work for which they seek... is orphaned.").
37. See generally Sprigman, supranote 34.
38. Id. at 490.
39. Id. at 490-91.
40. Id.
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While this proposal seems appealing in its ability to provide ownership
information to users, its compliance with international law is dubious.
International law prohibits the attachment of formalities to the enjoyment
and exercise of copyright protection." While some minor formalities have
been upheld as valid under Berne,42 virtual entry of a work into the public
domain for noncompliance with a formality is a harsh consequence which
would seemingly violate Berne.43 Professor Sprigman counters this
assertion by arguing that an author who fails to comply with the new
formalities would merely be converting a property right entitlement into
a liability right entitlement which is not prohibited under Berne. 44 But
Berne and international copyright law call for a property system with
attachment of rights upon creation, and not upon any further affirmative
steps by authors. 45 Reintroducing formalities, even in a liability system,
would condition copyright protection upon more than mere creation and
would therefore likely put the system into noncompliance with
international law.
2. Reasonable Efforts Requirement
The leading proposal for determining orphan status provides that when
a potential user attempts a reasonable, good faith search for a copyright
owner and fails, the work acquires orphan status. 46 This is the approach
favored by the Orphan Works Act of 2006. 4" A reasonably diligent search
41. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Paris Act,
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ipiberne/trtdocswoOOl .html ("The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject
to any formality") [hereinafter Berne].
42. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2005) ("Registration as prerequisite to certain remedies for
infringement").
43. See Report, supra note 3; Reply Comments of Jane Ginsburg & Paul Goldstein, at 3bi
(May 9, 2005) [hereinafter Ginsburg & Goldstein Comment] ("To make non registration
determinative of any diminution in the author's rights would likely put the U.S. in non compliance
with its international obligations.").
44. Sprigman, supranote 34, at 557; see also Huang, supranote 19, at 281.
45. Brito & Dooling, supra note 11, at 93-94.
46. Query whether orphan status refers only to the present user and the present use or whether
orphan status carries over to other users as well. See, e.g., Denise Troll Covey, Rights, Registries,
and Remedies: An Analysis of Responses to the Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry Regarding
Orphan Works, FREE CuLTuRE & THE DIGrrAL LmR. SYMP. 105, 131-32 (2005) (discussing
"piggybacking" and whether future users can rely on the reasonable search efforts of previous users
in shielding themselves from liability).
47. Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006) (limiting remedies against
users who "performed and documented a reasonably diligent search in good faith to locate the
owner of the infringed copyright").
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in a particular situation would likely depend on the type of work
involved,48 and would include factors such as the amount of identifying
information, whether the work is published, the age of the work, whether
ownership information is present in public records, whether the author is
alive, and the nature and extent of the use including whether the use is
commercial
and how prominently the copyrighted work figures into the
49
use.

Most of the debate over a reasonable efforts requirement involves what
exactly is required for reasonableness. The main rift is over whether the
standard should be formal or ad hoc. The Copyright Office Report favors
the ad hoc approach for its flexibility and general applicability to a wide
variety of works and uses.5" But, because of its flexibility, the ad hoc
approach could be slow and bureaucratic, and may provide little certainty
to users in determining whether a search is reasonable and consequently
whether a work has been orphaned.51 The ad hoc approach may therefore
not solve the risk and uncertainty that lies at the heart of the orphan works
problem.
The formal approach, on the other hand, has the benefit of certainty. A
user can know whether a search is reasonable and therefore use a work
without much risk.52 The formal approach also places the burden of
providing current contact information on the copyright owner who is best
able to bear it.53 But the formal approach cannot possibly cover every type
of copyrighted work and every type of use. An old, unpublished
photograph, for example, would require a different type of search than
would a more recently written short story. Also, resources and search
techniques vary among industries, making a fair and effective formal
search standard impossible to create for a broad range of works.54
Whether formal or ad hoc, a reasonable efforts requirement itself may
have some shortcomings. Any ambiguity in the definition of

48. See July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 16.
49. See Report, supra note 3, at 9-10.
50. Id. at 9.
51. See, e.g., id.; Reply Comments of Creative Commons & Save the Music, at 18 (May 9,
2005) [hereinafter Creative Commons Reply].
52. While a reasonable search may have been conducted, the cost of actually litigating and
proving the issue may still be prohibitive for some users. Therefore, although risk of liability may
be reduced, the risk of costly litigation may still be present. Allowing defendants to recover
reasonable attorneys' fees upon successful defense may help alleviate this concern and promote
broader use.
53. See Report, supranote 3, at 72; see also Creative Commons Reply, supranote 51, at 17.
54. This problem could eventually be solved by the creation of industry specific search
requirements established by trade organizations. See infra text accompanying note 59.
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reasonableness would create the same risk and uncertainty that plagues the
orphan works problem." Proving reasonable efforts in court would be
costly, which could prevent even users who do conduct a reasonable
search from using the work anyway.56 A reasonable search requirement
may also create perverse incentives for potential users to hope for a failed
search. A potential user may get the best of both worlds by conducting a
minimally reasonable search and using the work without permission. By
doing so, the user would still bear the risk that an owner will sue for
infringement, but because the work is considered orphaned, the amount to
be paid after proof of infringement, and with it the expected cost of use,
is reduced. Therefore, the user could use the work for free and risk only a
minimal penalty if later sued for infringement. 7 This could discourage any
further effort above a minimally reasonable search and could therefore
harm the objective of enabling negotiation of an efficient, voluntary
license.
Despite its possible shortcomings, a reasonable efforts requirement is
likely the best approach to defining orphanhood." It creates some
incentive for both copyright owners and users to attempt to come together.
Owners are incentivized to attach proper identifying information to their
works to make the reasonable search requirement a tougher standard for
a potential user to meet. Potential users are incentivized to make some
effort, although possibly only minimal effort, to find an owner and request
55. See Covey, supra note 46, at 123 ("ambiguous definitions or criteria of 'reasonableness'
will go the same route as the 'fair use' defense to copyright infringement: self-censorship by
creators and gatekeeping by publishers. Ambiguity will yield to requiring permission because the
risk of liability is too great.").
56. See Brito & Dooling, supranote 11, at 109 n.207 ("Some risk would remain because the
user would have to do enough of a search to show a court that they had conducted a reasonable
search in good faith. It is always possible that a court would not agree, which is what sometimes
happens when defendants claim fair use.").
57. Failure to find an owner after a minimally reasonable search allows a user to use the work
without paying upfront. The worst possible outcome of such use would be payment of the same fee
that the user would have had to pay had the owner originally been found. Any logical user would
prefer to pay nothing now when the only risk is later payment of that same amount, but only if
caught. See PPA Comment, supra note 28, at 6.
The orphan works amendment creates an incentive to fail in searching for an artist.
Rather than paying to license works, users will have every incentive not to find the
artist, and can proceed to exploit the artist's work without abandon, knowing...
the artist will only be able to collect a minimal fee.
Id.
58. See July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 18 ("[A] reasonable effort search,
notwithstanding its downsides, is probably the fairest balance of the various approaches.").
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permission for use. Eventually, industry specific standards may emerge
which would aid potential users in knowing how to conduct a reasonable
search, and a greater number ofprivate firms may emerge which specialize
in conducting owner searches.5 9
B. Treatment of Orphan Works
Once a work is classified as orphaned, a distinction must be made
between solutions which have a bearing on the copyright status of the
work and those which merely affect the remedy a copyright owner can
obtain after proving infringement. The type of solution will affect both its
effectiveness and its compliance with domestic and international law.
1. Loss of Copyright Protection Itself
The proposals with the toughest repercussions for orphanhood include
forfeiture of copyright protection altogether. The Public Domain
Enhancement Act6" proposes a system whereby a minor renewal fee is
imposed on owners after an initial fifty year copyright term. The fee would
serve as a test to determine whether a copyrighted work is commercially
or otherwise valuable to its owner.6 ' Unrenewed works would be presumed
valueless and copyright protection would therefore lapse. A similar
proposal calls for indefinitely renewable copyright protection allowing
owners to renew their rights almost in perpetuity. 62 Once a work goes
unrenewed, it would irreversibly enter the public domain.63
The result of such forfeiture proposals would be easier entry of works
into the public domain for subsequent use without permission or payment.
Entry of works into the public domain would be widespread 6 because a
59. See Report, supra note 3; Comment of Recording Artist Groups Part I [hereinafter
Recording Artists Comment], available at http://www.futureofinusic.org/news/orphanworks.cfin
("[Potential users] can hire any of several firms that specialize in copyright clearance."); see also
Brito & Dooling, supra note 11, at 110 ("Private firms (perhaps the very same firms offering
private registration to rightsholders) might begin to offer search services to potential users at
different prices correlated to more or less extensive searches. This would be similar to existing real
estate title search companies that scour public records for title information.").
60. Public Domain Enhancement Act, HR 2408, 109th Cong. (2005).
61. See Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ, http://www.eldred.cc/eafaq.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2007).
62. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CH.
L. REv. 471, 473 (2003).
63. See id. at 474.
64. See Wikipedia Entry for "Public Domain Enhancement Act" ("[A] huge wave of
previously unseen, unused, and forgotten works would spill in to the public domain, free for anyone
to tamper with.").
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very small percentage of copyrighted works retain value to their owners
after a certain period of time.65 Under the previous copyright system which
required registration and renewal for protection,66 fewer than 11% of
works registered between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end of their
terms, even though the cost of renewal was small.67 If forfeiture of
copyright protection were adopted as an orphan works solution, the public
domain would swell with new works for potential users to use freely
without risk of litigation.68
While this proposed solution may help to solve the orphan works
problem, some valuable works may inadvertently and unjustly enter the
public domain.6 9 Copyright owners could be unaware of the requirement
of renewal or simply forget to renew valuable works.7" This inadvertent
loss of copyright protection is a major reason why the 1909 Copyright Act
was replaced with a regime that does not require renewal for continued
protection.7 Aside from issues of fairness, loss of copyright protection for
orphaned works would also run into Berne compliance issues, as renewal
is applied as a precondition to the enjoyment and exercise of copyright
protection.

65. See Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ, supra note 61 ("We estimate that of all the
work copyrighted between 1923 and 1942 (the first twenty years affected by the Sonny Bono
[copyright extension term] Act), only 2% has any continuing commercial value."); see also Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 804 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 464
(7th ed. 2006).
67. Landes & Posner, supra note 62, at 473.
68. See Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ, supranote 61 ("If the proposal were adopted
as outlined, then within three years, over 90% of the copyrighted [works created] between 1923 and
1952 would be in the public domain.").
69. For a discussion of inadvertent and unjust consequences attached to forfeiture for failure
to comply with copyright formalities, see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at *134 (1976) ("A substantial
burden and expense, this unclear and highly technical requirement results in incalculable amounts
of unproductive work. In a number of cases it is the cause of inadvertent and unjust loss of
copyright."); see also Brief for Appellee, Kahle v. Gonzales, No. 04-17434 (9th Cir. Mar. 2005),
availableat http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/attachments/gov't%209cir/20opp%20brief.pdf.
70. See Barris v. Hamilton, No. 96 Civ. 9541, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7225, at * 14 (S.D.N.Y.
May 17, 1999), for an example of valuable photographs inadvertently losing copyright protection
for failure to renew at the proper time. See also Robert W. Clarida, Foreign Publication Pitfalls:
Practice Pointers, available at http://www.legallanguage.com/lawarticles/Clarida004.html (last
visited Aug. 8, 2007) (discussing the ironic and unjust outcome of Barris).
71. See GoRMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 66, at 467.
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2. Limited Remedies
Unlike solutions involving forfeiture of copyright protection for orphan
works, those solutions which retain protection but limit the available
remedies for infringement would not entail Berne compliance issues. U.S.
copyright law currently requires some minor formalities for plaintiffs to
be eligible for full infringement remedies.72 A limited remedy solution to
the orphan works problem would also avoid the inadvertent forfeiture of
copyright protection which unfairly burdens copyright owners.
a. Fair Use Affirmative Defense
Some scholars have proposed a fair use affirmative defense to
infringement of an orphan work. William Patry and Richard Posner
propose an expansion of fair use to include works whose authors fail to
take reasonable steps to show the works are still of value to them.73 Similar
to the public domain solutions discussed above, authors who fail to signal
the continuing value of their works would be kept from recovering for
infringement. But, unlike the forfeiture solutions discussed above, rather
than falling into the public domain for the public to use freely, failure to
signal value here would allow the affirmative defense of fair use.74
Patry and Posner argue that the statutory fair use factors75 are merely
proxies for the feasibility of a market transaction.76 Because the orphan

72. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411 (requiring registration as prerequisite to an infringement
action); see also 17 U.S.C. § 412 (requiring registration for recovery of statutory damages and
attorneys fees).
73. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1660 (2004).
74. See Lessig Blog, Fair Use and Licensing ("[I]t should be considered fair use to copy an
old work if the copyright owner hasn't taken reasonable steps to provide notice of his continued
rights..."), at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/002114.shtml.
75. The four statutory fair use factors, as found in the Copyright Act, are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
76. Patry & Posner, supranote 73, at 1650 ("The key point is that it is not the amount copied
that is determinative [of the fair use defense] in the present context, although that is one of the
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works problem is inherently one of market failure, in any case involving
an orphan work, fair use analysis should apply. Patry and Posner further
argue that depriving a copyright owner of an infringement remedy through
a fair use defense would not be unfair to owners. An owner who fails to
signal value and who is therefore hard to locate necessarily would not be
extracting any value from licensing the work. Any loss of a remedy would
therefore merely be loss of a windfall.77
Expansion of the fair use defense does little to actually bring copyright
owners and potential users together. Rather, the fair use solution simply
attempts to give a legal out to users who fail to receive permission for use.
In doing so, the fair use defense does little to remove the uncertainty
surrounding a use for which an owner cannot be found. Fair use is often
too unpredictable to eliminate the risk of using a work without
permission.78 Although Patry and Posner propose a targeted expansion of
the fair use defense after a reasonable search is conducted, the standard of
what constitutes a reasonable search remains uncertain for potential users.
Therefore, although works deemed orphans would enjoy a blanket fair use
defense, uncertainty remains as to which works would be deemed orphans
qualified for the defense. This uncertainty, combined with risk aversion to
lawsuits, makes a fair use affirmative defense an inadequate solution on
its own.7 9 Aside from its ineffectiveness, expansion of the fair use defense
may also pose problems with international law under Berne if the defense
was complete and would thereby interfere with the enjoyment and exercise
of the rights in the work.8"

optional statutory factors, but the feasibility of a market transaction.").
77. Id. at 1646, 1651.
78. See Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 (Jan. 26, 2005) ("[T]he fair use defense is
often too unpredictable as a general matter to remove the uncertainty in the user's mind."); see also
Covey, supra note 46, at 108 ("Relying on fair use is too risky...").
79. See Huang, supra note 19, at 273 ("'[U]ncertainties of the application of the fair use
doctrine,' and a significant desire among many art publishers 'to eliminate the risk of an
infringement suit entirely' render[] fair use an imperfect solution [to the orphan works problem].").
80. See Sprigman, supra note 34, at 553 n.240:
The uncertainty attending... expanding fair use would be a more costly and less
effective solution than direct reformalization... Although a full analysis of these
provisions is outside the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that the Berne status
of the fair use expansion proposed by Patry and Posner will be subject to debate.
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b. Default Licenses
Rather than the complete defense of fair use, some commentators
suggest a default license solution that would limit the recovery for
infringement of an orphan work to reasonable compensation. 8 This is the
approach favored by the Orphan Works Act of 2006,82 Professor Sprigman
in his proposal to reinstitute copyright formalities,83 and organizations such
as Creative Commons and Save the Music in their comments to the
Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry.'
The Canadian copyright system has created a type of default license
scheme whereby potential users can provide notice of intent to use a
work85 for which the owner cannot be located.86 Users may apply to the
Copyright Board of Canada for a license after reasonable efforts have been
made to locate the owner.87 The user must pay a royalty fee which is held
by a copyright collective society in case the owner surfaces and sues for
infringement within five years of the expiration of the license.88 If the
owner does not come forward, the society may then dispose of the money
as it wishes for the benefit of its members.89 Since 1990, 192 licenses have
been issued by the board out of only 198 total applications.9 °

81. Report, supra note 3, at 115.
82. The Orphan Works Act of 2006 reads, in part: "an award for monetary relief (including
actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorney's fees) may not be made, other than an order
requiring the infringer to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the infringed work." H.R.
5439, 109th Cong.§ 2(b)(1)(A) (2006).
83. See Sprigman, supranote 34, at 490-91 ("Noncompliance with the new-style formalities
would subject works to a perpetual and irrevocable 'default license,' with royalties set at a very low
level, thus effectively moving works into the public domain.").
84. See Creative Commons Comment, supranote 3, at 16-19 (proposing a two-tiered default
license system for published and unpublished works).
85. Notice of intent to use registries are discussed infra Part III.C.1.
86. The Japanese copyright regime has a similar provision allowing the Commissioner of the
Agency for Cultural Affairs to grant a nonvoluntary license where a potential user could not
identify or contact the owner of a work despite having made a reasonable search. See TERVO DOI,
JAPAN § 8[2](D), in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul Edward Geller ed.,
Lexis Nexis 2006).
87. Copyright Board of Canada, Unlocatable Copyright Owners: Brochure, http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/unlocatablelbrochure-e.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Copyright Board of Canada, Unlocatable Copyright Owners: Decisions/Licences
Issued, http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/licences-e.html (last visited Sept. 11,2007). While the
small number of uses requested from the board may signal some sort of ineffectiveness in the
system, a smaller Canadian market for copyright licenses or a fewer number of orphan works may
be to blame.

COPYRIGHT ORPHAN WORKS: A MULTI-PRONGED SOLUTION

A default license system would have the benefit of avoiding ambiguity
and unpredictability in allowing users to better estimate the expected cost
of using an orphan work. But users would still have to be certain that a
work was actually orphaned and therefore eligible for the limited remedy.
On its own, a default license system does little to either bring copyright
owners and potential users together, or to signal to potential users that a
work is no longer valuable to the author and therefore freely usable.
Furthermore, as discussed above, limiting an infringement remedy to only
reasonable compensation could create a perverse incentive whereby
potential users would prefer to use a work without permission rather than
attempt to find an owner and pay a license fee.9
The greatest obstacle in establishing a fair default license system is the
determination of reasonable compensation.92 Reasonable compensation has
been defined as the reasonable license fee the parties would have agreed
to before the infringing use commenced. 93 It is difficult to determine after
use what a reasonable license fee would have been had the parties been
able to negotiate prior to use. Attempting to establish a reasonable license
fee after use entails a hindsight bias that allows the copyright owner to see
the value of a work to a user which takes away any bargaining power a
user may have had prior to use. Uses that likely would have been licensed
for a small, nominal fee could turn out to be attached to new works of
unpredictable popularity and value. Having this information would allow
the copyright owner to argue for a higher license fee after use and would,
in essence, award the copyright owner a windfall.
A default license regime may also fail to account for the non-monetary
value of a work to its original author. Authors may object to uses of their
products for reasons other than insufficient compensation, which would be
difficult to value or ignored completely in determination of a reasonable
default license fee. Furthermore, the Copyright Act grants certain moral
rights to authors of some works. 94 These rights may also be difficult to
value or may be ignored by a default license solution which proposes
monetary payment to an author. 95 While some of these valuation issues
91. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
92. See Covey, supra note 46, at 127; see also PPA Comment, supranote 28, at 10.
93. Report, supra note 3, at 116.
94. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing authors of visual works of art
certain rights of attribution and integrity).
95. For example, the economic and license value of a novel may not fully capture the value
to its original author of future character development, literary reputation, and the like. See Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfus, Commodifying CollaborativeResearch 7-8 (New York Univ. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 42, 2002), availableat http://ssm.com/
abstract id=315020 (noting that "for participants in the creative process there can be a personhood
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might be solved with the use of Copyright Royalty Judges similar to those
currently found in copyright law,96 issues of valuation and non-monetary
value to authors would pervade any default license system.
C. CopyrightRegistries
Because the lack of a comprehensive registry is directly linked to the
orphan works problem,97 most proposals include the formation of a
copyright registry. Creation of some form of registry is included in
solutions involving reformalization of copyright,98 entry of orphan works
into the public domain,99 expansion of fair use,'0° and default licenses.''
Formation of an effective, reliable registry will best allow potential users
and copyright owners to find one another and come to an efficient market
solution.
dimension to intellectual property that is absent in the relationship between that same property and
a stranger" so that "the debate over balancing producer and user interests in intellectual property
rights will not always fully capture the intimate connection between creators and their own
works.").
96. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-805.
97. See, e.g., Khong, supranote 20, at 71 ("The problem of unknown owner of a copyrighted
work is directly related to the absence of a reliable register system to determine ownership."); see
also Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. C-04-1127 MMC, 2004 WL 2663157, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19,2004)
("Plaintiffs contend that '[w]ithout notice, there is no clear way to know where copyright is
claimed' and '[w]ithout a registry, there is no reasonable method for identifying copyright
owners."'); Landes & Posner, supra note 62, at 477 ("Equally immense tracing costs would be
required to determine the ownership of a parcel of land if titles to land were not recorded in a public
registry. It is not perpetual property rights but the absence of registration that creates prohibitive
tracing costs.").
98. See Sprigman, supra note 34, at 555 ("The simplest solution would be to preserve
formally voluntary registration...").
99. The Public Domain Enhancement Act reads, in part:
SEC 4. DUTIES OF REGISTER
Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Register
of Copyrights shall(1) establish procedures to minimize the burden of submitting the form prescribed
under section 306(c) to title 17, United States Code, including procedures to allow
the electronic submission of the form to the Copyright Office; and
(2) establish procedures to make the information contained in forms submitted
under section 306(c) of such title easily accessible to the public.
Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).
100. See Patry & Posner, supra note 73, at 1651 ("search of the registry would be a
prerequisite to the assertion of a fair use right to copy.").
101. See Creative Commons Comment, supra note 3, at 16 ("An Appropriate, Well-tailored
Response Would Be to Establish a Registry to Signal Whether Works are Orphaned or Not.").
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1. Intent to Use Registry
One registry proposal would have potential users of possible orphan
works register their proposed use and leave it to the owner to object.' °2
Similar to the Canadian system discussed above, a use registry would
require users to post a notice of intent to use as a step in due diligence. 1°3
The benefits of such a registry would be to help bring copyright owners
and potential users together"° while helping to keep potential users honest
in conducting and documenting their search efforts. 0 5 Furthermore, if
potential users are allowed to piggyback °6 on the previous postings of
other users, this could lead to greater efficiency by allowing subsequent
users to avoid duplicating the search efforts of others.
User registries would, however, also impose great burdens on copyright
owners. Owners would have to consistently search the registry to ensure
their works were not being used without permission."' This would likely
be an impermissible requirement under international law'0" and would be
inefficient compared to the alternative of having a potential user search an
owner registry prior to use.
2. Mandatory Owner Registry
The proposals of both Professor Sprigman and Creative Commons
include a de facto mandatory owner registry. Sprigman calls for
reinstatement of the registration formality for copyright protection, 0 9 and
the portion of the Creative Commons proposal dealing with published
works calls for default licenses for works not registered within twenty-five
years of their publication." I0 Registration would be de facto mandatory
102. See id.; see also Recording Artists Comment, supranote 59.
103. Covey, supra note 46, at 130.
104. Brito & Dooling, supra note 11, at 111 ("The establishment of an ICANN-like registry
may help users of orphan works show their efforts to locate rightsholders, and may help connect
potential users with the rightsholders they seek.").
105. Report, supra note 3, at 76 ("[R]equiring a prospective user to file a public document,
under penalty of perjury, would 'keep the users honest."').
106. See supra note 46.
107. July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 67 ("1 think it would be very difficult for an
individual creator to have to check some type of registry on a continual basis to make sure his or
her work was not being used.").
108. See Ginsburg & Goldstein Comment, supranote 43, § 3(b)(ii) ("[User registries] would
violate the very notion of exclusive rights at the heart of Beme/TRIPs.").
109. Sprigman, supranote 34.
110. Creative Commons Comment Reply, supranote 51, at 11 (The proposal recommends that
Congress amend the copyright law to require that "[h]olders of copyrights in publishedworks who
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because a search of the registry would be sufficient to constitute a
reasonable search."' Therefore, failure to register or keep contact
information current would allow use of the work by others without
permission.
The benefits of a mandatory registry include near certainty regarding
orphanhood and a large step toward bringing owners and potential users
together to negotiate a licensed use. But a mandatory registry would have
major drawbacks as well and would likely not comply with the
requirements of international law. The justification for a mandatory
registry relies on the assumption that only works which are no longer
valuable to their authors will go unregistered. This assumption may not be
true as authors may either forget to register or are simply unaware of the
requirement that they do so. The old 1909 Copyright Act was abandoned
in great part to avoid such inadvertent and unjust forfeiture of copyright
protection."' With a new registration requirement, authors stand at risk of
having their copyright protection lapse inadvertently. Furthermore,
mandatory registries may actually be counterproductive by serving as a
disincentive to licensing. Any system which forfeits copyright protection
based on noncompliance with a formality would encourage use without
permission rather than voluntary licensing." 3 Therefore, a mandatory
registry may not serve the interest of promoting voluntary licensing but
would instead simply provide a legal out for users." 4
A mandatory registry may also run afoul of Berne's requirement that
no formalities be imposed which limit the enjoyment and exercise of
copyright protection." 5 Under a mandatory registration system, a
copyright owner would suffer a diminution of protection by not
registering." 6 Therefore, requiring registration could be an impermissible

wish to retain the full scope of remedies that current copyright law provides must register their
works within a 25-year period following publication." (emphasis in original)).
111. Creative Commons Reply, supra note 51, at 12 ("A search of the registry would be
enough to constitute the 'reasonable' inquiry required to determine that a work is [an] orphan.").
112. See supratext accompanying notes 69-71.
113. Report, supra note 3, at 74 ("[A]ny system that causes an owner to lose all rights upon
failure to satisfy a formality discourages, not encourages, voluntary licensing, because it gives an
incentive not to negotiate with an owner who failed to comply with formalities.").
114. Id. at 73 ("[A mandatory registry] fail[s] to address the fundamental problem of the
orphan work situation-i.e., market failure--and instead just 'define[s] it away."').
115. See Brito & Dooling, supranote 11, at 102 ("Nothing in the Creative Commons proposal
overcomes the issues that make both the Lessig and Sprigman solutions incompatible with the
Beme convention.").
116. Id.
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precondition to copyright protection. 1 7 While proponents of mandatory
registration argue that failure to register would not lessen copyright
protection," 18 most would agree that making orphanhood (and with it free
or cheaper use) dependant on owner registration would be a diminution of
protection and would therefore not be permissible under Berne. 9 While
the idea of a registry could work to bring owners and potential users
together, submission must not be mandatory or the registry will be Berne
noncompliant.
3. Voluntary Owner Registry
The benefits of a registry can be achieved without some of the
drawbacks by making submission of a work into the registry voluntary. A
voluntary registry would make owners easier to find and would therefore
facilitate negotiation and licensing. 2 ° A purely voluntary registry would
also comply with the provisions of Berne, as submission would not be a
required formality to copyright protection.' 2 '
117. See id.at 92 ("Therefore, compliance with formalities under [a mandatory registration]
system is a precondition to full enjoyment and exercise of copyright in violation of Berne."
(emphasis added)).
118. See, e.g., Creative Commons Comment, supranote 3, at 16-17:
Failure to register within a 25-year period following publication ...does not
vitiate copyright, but moves the work into "orphan" status.... It is important to
emphasize that failure to register ... would not remove the work's copyright
protection; it would, rather, serve as a signal that the unregistered work was an
orphan, and, therefore, that the rightsholder was no longer exploiting the work...
119. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Goldstein Comment, supra note 43, § 3(b)(i):
Inability to find an owner through the Copyright Office register, or, for that
matter, another publicly accessible registry, such as the ASCAP database, may be
probative of "orphaned" status, but it cannot, standing alone, suffice to justify the
designation. To make non registration determinative of any diminution in the
author's rights would likely put the U.S. in non compliance with its international
obligations.
See also Report, supra note 3, at 74 ("Another frequent criticism of amandatory owner registrywas
that it would.., violate Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Most of the commenters who held
this view appeared to consider the violation so obvious as not to require any in-depth analysis...").
120. Report, supra note 3, at 75 ("Voluntary registries of owners, obviously, would make the
owners easier to find, and thus would facilitate negotiation.").
121. See Sprigman, supra note 34, at 541 ("Those provisions of U.S. law that provide for
voluntary formalities-i.e., voluntary notice, registration, and recordation oftransfers-andthat
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To pass muster under Berne, the registry would have to be truly
voluntary. Failure to submit a work to the registry must not materially
hinder the enjoyment and exercise of the rights in a work. 122 But the
voluntary nature of the registry could limit its effectiveness. A major
concern would be the incentive to register without the existence of a
penalty for non-submission.123 The problem of orphan works is somewhat
attributable to inactive rightsholders who would not be likely to submit
works in a purely voluntary system. 124 Therefore, any proposal including
a voluntary registry needs to create enough incentive for owners to submit
their works or the registry will be incomplete and ineffective.
Other possible limitations of a voluntary registry are cost and
efficiency. 125 The cost of creating and maintaining a registry may outweigh
its benefits, especially if the registry is incomplete due to its voluntary
nature. Searchability of the registry would also be a factor, especially for
certain types of works such as photographs. 126 Any viable proposal
including a voluntary registry must therefore account for these possible
limitations.
IV. PROPOSAL: A MULTI-PRONGED SOLUTION
This Article proposes a multi-pronged solution to the orphan works
problem including: (1) a reasonable efforts requirement; (2) a voluntary
registry; and (3) a presumption that submission to the voluntary registry
would preclude orphan status. This proposal serves the ultimate purpose
of an orphan works solution by actually aiding potential users in locating
and negotiating with copyright owners.

provide incentives for compliance either apply only to U.S. works ... or are not the type of
formality that Berne prohibits.").
122. See July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 107 ("It has to be a voluntary registry and there
can be no consequences for not being in the registry.).
123. See id. at 102, 123 (asking what incentives there would be for registration in a voluntary
registry); see also 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, at 3742 (Jan. 26, 2005) ("Would there be sufficient incentive
for copyright owners to register in a permissive system?").
124. See Creative Commons Comment, supra note 3, at 21 ("A change of law is needed
because the problem lies with inactive rightsholders who are by definition, not likely to opt in to
a voluntary system.").
125. See Report, supra note 3, at 75; see also id. at 6 ("Some copyright owners expressed
concern about even voluntary registries as not offering much efficiency in certain cases, such as
photographs.").
126. See id. at 75.
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A. ReasonableEfforts Requirement
The solution proposed by this Article adopts the reasonable efforts
requirement as set forth in the Orphan Works Act of 2006.127 A potential
user should be required to make a good faith, reasonable effort to attempt
to locate and request permission from a rightsholder. This requirement
would provide proper incentives for rightsholders to provide adequate
identifying information, and for potential users to attempt to locate owners
to negotiate a mutually beneficial licensing arrangement. Once a potential
user complies with the reasonable efforts requirement, copyright
protection in the orphaned work should not be forfeited, but some sort of
limited remedy should be imposed.
As discussed above, the main limitation of a reasonable efforts
approach is defining a reasonably diligent search. This Article adopts the
ad hoc approach to reasonable efforts which would include such factors as
the amount of identifying information included with the work, whether the
work is published, the age of the work, whether the author is alive, the
nature and extent of the use including whether the use is commercial and
how prominently the copyrighted work figures into the use, and whether
ownership information is present in public records.2 8 The presence of
ownership information in public records will play an important role in the
proposed regime.
B. Voluntary Owner Registry
To aid potential users in their reasonable efforts to locate rightsholders,
a voluntary registry of copyrighted works should be established and
maintained by the Copyright Office. The registry should include digital
copies of works and/or detailed descriptions indexed in a searchable
format. Copyright owners should be encouraged to include ownership and
contact information in a manner similar to some registries currently in
existence,"' and would be responsible for keeping information current
127. See supra text accompanying note 47.
128. See supra text accompanying note 49.
129. See, e.g., Visual Arts Registry:
(c)(2)(i) Identification of the artist, including name, current address, age, and
telephone number, if publicly listed.
(c)(2)(ii) Identification of the work or works, including the title, dimensions, and
physical description of the work and the copyright registration number, if known.
Additionally, it is recommended that one or more 8 x 10 photographs of the work
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upon change in contact information or change in ownership. A voluntary
owner registry will help alleviate the orphan works problem by helping to
define the requirements of a reasonably diligent search. 30 Search of the
registry would be probative of whether a particular search was reasonably
diligent' but would not be dispositive,' 32 thereby keeping the registry
from conflicting with international law.
1. Benefits of a Voluntary Owner Registry
a. Benefits to the Orphan Works Situation
As discussed above, an owner registry would help provide information
to potential users thereby helping to alleviate the market breakdown which
keeps users from finding and negotiating permission from copyright
owners.' 33 The combination of such a registry with a reasonable efforts

on good quality photographic paper be included in the submission; the images
should be clear and in focus.
37 C.F.R. § 201.25; see also Jessica L. Darraby, Art, Artifact & Architecture Law § 9:03[5][e]
(2001 ed.). VARA is 17 U.S.C. § 106(A):
(3) The Register of Copyrights shall establish a system of records whereby any
author of a work of visual art that has been incorporated in or made part of a
building, may record his or her identity and address with the Copyright Office.
The Register shall also establish procedures under which any such author may
update the information so recorded, and procedures under which owners of
buildings may record with the Copyright Office evidence of their efforts to
comply with this subsection.
17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(3).
130. See Varian, supra note 21, at 15 ("As we have hinted, a very natural interpretation of
'effort' would be the effort required to register or look up a work in a centralized database. [W]e
could expect that a copyright registry along with a 'diligent search' requirement would come close
to solving the problems outlined above.").
131. See Report, supra note 3, at 103 ("One of the most important factors in determining
whether a search was reasonable is the extent to which information about the copyright owner's
identity and location are available in publicly available registries, databases, or other sources.").
132. See Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, at 3742 (Jan. 26,2005) ("If optional, the registry
might serve asjust one factor in determining whether the copyright owner was locatable."); see also
August 2, 2005 Orphan Works Roundtable 141 [hereinafter Aug. 2 Roundtable] ("I do think that
the registry idea is just one step in the identification of orphan works.").
133. See supra Part III.C.
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requirement would provide for greater information and further facilitation
of negotiated use. 34
Although it is assumed that the registry would contain accurate and up
to date information, even erroneous contact information may provide some
benefit to those users who are not sure whether a work has been orphaned.
Even where an owner's information has changed or when copyright
ownership has been transferred, presence in the registry may still serve as
a signal that the work is valuable and has not been orphaned.' 35 Therefore,
a voluntary registry would serve two important functions which would
help to alleviate the orphan works problem: (1) when the owner
information is accurate, the registry would help to bring owners and users
together; and (2) when the owner information is not accurate, the registry
would provide a signal to users that a work is still valuable and is therefore
off limits for use without permission.
b. Additional Benefits Beyond the Orphan Works Situation
Aside from helping to solve the market failure contributing to the
orphan works problem, a registry would have additional benefits in line
with the objectives of copyright law. Notably, collection and digitization
of works into a registry would aid in archiving and preservation efforts,
thereby enabling the dissemination and future use of these works.'3 6
(1) Preservation and Archiving of Creative Works
Mass collection and digitization of copyrighted works would aid
archiving and preservation efforts to ensure works are not lost to future
generations. 3 7 This applies both to works currently under copyright
protection and to those whose term of protection has lapsed and who have
134. See July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 112 ("a multi-pronged approach, one part of
which was reasonable efforts and one part of which was a voluntary registry which would allow
the copyright holder their ability to be found for the works to not be orphaned if that was their
wish.").
135. Aug. 2 Roundtable, supra note 132, at 103 ("[T]here's a second and very important
function that registration serves. And that is even if... the information's not up to date, you can
treat it as a signal. And that signal is this work is not [an] orphan...").
136. See Brief for the Internet Archive as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, at * 13 (2003) (No. 01-618) ("the Internet-the dominant platform for
access to digital archives-provides relatively unlimited low cost capacity to support both the
archiving of, and universal access to, traditional printed works, as well as audio, video, and still
images.").
137. See id. at *3 ("digitization will greatly reduce the cost of preserving our cultural history
and eliminate deterioration caused regularly through the physical handling of cultural artifacts.").
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entered the public domain. Having both protected and public domain
works in a centralized registry promotes the use of these works in new
creative endeavors,' 38 thereby furthering one of the major objectives of
copyright law.139
(2) Dissemination of Creative Works to the Public
A digital registry would also increase public access to works in
situations where access costs would have otherwise been prohibitive.140 A
centralized registry would be a cheaper and more efficient way to search
for existing works. The facilitation of broad access to creative works is a
major objective of copyright protection 141 which is promoted by the
establishment of a centralized registry of copyrighted works.
2. Possible Limitations of a Voluntary Owner Registry
a. Cost
Concern is often expressed regarding the cost of creating and
maintaining a digital registry.'42 Marybeth Peters, the Register of
Copyrights, estimates that digitizing what is currently on record with the
138. See id. ("Digital technology allows us the opportunity to build a 'universal' library that
dwarfs the collections of the Alexandria Library and even our modem Library of Congress...
accessible in formats that uniquely support and promote creativity in the arts and sciences...");
see also id. at * 16 ("Digital Archives Support Rich and Diverse Use of Our Cultural Heritage...
Digital archives foster new and innovative use of works in the public domain.").
139. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.03(A) n.2 (noting that copyright law is "intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired." (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)); also
noting that "it is clear that the real purpose of the copyright scheme is to encourage works of the
intellect, and that this purpose is to be achieved by the reliance on the economic incentives granted
to authors and inventors by the copyright scheme." (quoting Univeral City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd464 U.S. 417 (1894))).
140. See Brief for Internet Archive as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, at *15 (2003) ("Digital archiving... eliminates many of these barriers
and makes our vast resources available to almost anyone who wishes to use them.").
141. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 126 S. Ct. 769, 800 (2003) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("But as our
cases repeatedly and consistently emphasize, ultimate public access is the overriding purpose of
the constitutional provision.").
142. See, e.g., Report, supra note 3, at 29-30 n.46 ("Many participants suggested that
[digitizing] would greatly reduce the search costs associated with searching for Copyright Office
records that are not currently available online. However, doing so would involve a significant
expenditure of resources.").
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Copyright Office would cost approximately $35 million.143 It is argued that
the costs associated with such a project would outweigh any benefit.'"
Digitization of certain types of works may not actually be as costly as
one would assume."' The Copyright Office has commissioned a study
regarding the cost and feasibility of converting its records to digital form'46
and has already begun digitizing works in its possession.'47 Notably, the
cost argument against a digital registry only applies to those works already
on record with the Copyright Office. While digitization of works already
on record may have a large one-time cost, the marginal cost of entering
future works into the registry could be minimal if not zero. Submission of
works to the registry can be accomplished by owners themselves through
an online submission process. The Copyright Office would initially receive
a work in its digital form, thereby minimizing digitization costs for entry
into the registry. While some digitization costs may be minimized, there
would still remain maintenance and other costs associated with a registry.
Regardless of any dispute over the magnitude of costs associated with
a digital registry, these costs are not without offsetting benefits. As
discussed above, a digital registry would help alleviate the market failure
contributing to the orphan works problem and would also carry important
external benefits in line with the objectives of copyright protection. While
the benefits may be difficult to value nominally, the creation of new works
and preservation of old works for future use are at the heart of copyright
protection'48 making any tool which furthers these objectives a valuable
addition to the copyright regime.
b. Searchability
Another concern with a digital registry would be its value and
searchability, particularly with visual works'4 9 such as photographs and

143. July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 43-44.
144. See Report, supra note 3, at 95 ("such systems would likely entail more resources and
efforts than the proponents anticipate or are readily available without providing offsetting
benefits...").
145. See, e.g., PPA Comment, supra note 28, at 16 ("Regarding attributed works, a registry
of authors/owners may be established using current technology and at minimal cost and burden to
authors and owners.").
146. Report, supranote 3, at 103 n.358.
147. July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 43.
148. See supra text accompanying note 139.
149. See July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 23 ("In terms of the visual arts it's very hard
to search for images even if they are registered with the Copyright Office.").

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. 12

illustrations.'50 The large quantity of copyrighted visual works could make
a search for a particular work prohibitively difficult. 5 ' Most photographs
are not accompanied by any textual information which would make it
difficult both for the Copyright Office to index the works and for potential
users to search for them.5 2 Search costs may therefore outweigh the
benefits of use leading potential users to abandon projects.
Technology exists today which would alleviate the burdens of
searching through a large number of works. The use of computers has
made it infinitely easier to conduct an efficient search.' 53 Smart search
engines currently exist'54 or are being developed' which would allow
greater ease and success in searching the registry. Optical character
recognition'56 and image recognition5 7 software is also currently available

150. See Report, supra note 3, at 24 ("The comments show that this obstacle is most
pervasive-by far-with photographs.").
151. See PPA Comment, supra note 28, at 14 ("The sheer numbers of photographs (both
digitized and not) would almost certainly frustrate any effort to create a comprehensive registry
allowing a meaningful search for the author of anonymous orphaned works.").
152. See Report, supra note 3, at 113 n.375 (it is "difficult to index [the works] in away that
is meaningful for users trying to locate an image with no identifying textual data").
153. See Travis, supra note 26, at 763 ("With the widespread use of personal computers and
the Internet, it has finally become feasible to create open access, efficiently searchable, infinitely
reproducible digital libraries on the scale of the world's great physical libraries.").
154. See, e.g., Creative Commons Comment, supra note 3, at 9-10 (discussing use of the
Creative Commons search function available at http://search.creativecommons.org); see also
Copyright Office search engine availableat http://www.copyright. com.
155. See Brief for Internet Archive as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners to Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), at *16-17.
[Digital archives] also offer the opportunity to exploit highly efficient and
productive search tools. For example, the Library of Congress ("LOC") preserves
a collection of nearly 121 million items ... one can simply go to www.loc.gov
and search their catalogue within minutes . . . Such technologies are either
currently available or quickly developing.
Id. at 16-17; see also July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 31 ("I think technology is going to
change and over time will make searches easier . . . as databases increase and technology
improves.").
156. Optical character recognition is a process by which a program will take a document,
identify each word on each page, and then allow a search of another document for every occurrence
of the word. For a full description of the technology, see Adobe Acrobat Capture 3, at
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrcapture/fullfeature.html; see also Brief for Internet Archive as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner to Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), at *16-17.
157. Image recognition is "[t]he identification of objects in an image. This process would
probably start with image processing techniques such as noise removal, followed by (low-level)
feature extraction to locate lines, regions and possibly areas with certain textures." See Free
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allowing for more efficient registry searches for both textual and visual
works." 8 Current and future technology will increase the ease by which
potential users will be able to use a digital registry as an effective tool to
locate information regarding seemingly lost owners. In addition to
advances in search technology, the rebuttable presumption proposed by
this Article would account for searching difficulties in particular cases. 5 9
c. Incentive to Voluntarily Submit Works
As discussed above, the greatest barrier to the formation and
effectiveness of a voluntary registry is the lack of incentive to submit a
work when not required to do so. 6 ' Limiting the enjoyment and exercise
of copyright protection for failure to register is not allowed under Berne,
but without some sort of incentive structure, a voluntary registry will be
incomplete and therefore inefficient to use. This would discourage some
searches and projects which would otherwise have been made.' 6 '
C. PresumptionAgainst Orphanhood
To solve the incentive problem, this Article proposes a legal
presumption against orphanhood which would attach to works submitted
to the registry. Proper submission would, in effect, serve as constructive
notice of ownership information similar to provisions already codified in
the Copyright Act.'62 It would essentially be presumed that a reasonable

Dictionary, Image Recognition, at http://computing-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/image+
recognition (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
158. See July 26 Roundtable, supra note 29, at 23 ("There [are] a number of image recognition
companies that are starting to come on the market. I've seen testing of someone named E-day in
Canada and [PicScout] in Israel that have almost changed images into a thumb print that will be
easier to search and find them."); see also Aug. 2 Roundtable, supra note 132, at 112 ("we have
photo search engines on the web... staganographic techniques..."). For examples of such image
recognition tools, see, e.g., PicScout Web Site, at http://www.picscout.com/; LTU Technologies
Web Site, at http://www.ltutech.com/en/; Attrasoft Web Site, at http://attrasoft.com/.
159. See infra Part IV.C.
160. See Varian,supra note 21, at 15 ("As we have seen, the seller must have an incentive to
enter and update its information in a copyright registry and the buyer must have an incentive to look
there.").
161. Knowledge of the incomplete nature of the voluntary register will serve to decrease the
expected success of a search while increasing or keeping constant the expected cost. This would
serve to deter some searches which would have otherwise been made had the possibility of success
been greater.
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c), which reads:
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search of the registry would have returned the desired owner information.
A subsequent user who fails to obtain permission for use would have to
overcome this presumption if the work was duly and accurately submitted
to voluntary registry. This could be a valuable benefit to copyright owners
thereby incentivizing registration.
The proposed solutions discussed above and most proposals to solve
the orphan works problem focus on the loss or diminution of copyright
protection for failure to attach contact information or to signal that a work
is still valuable to its owner. These proposals seem to presume that a work
has been orphaned based on the existence of some set of circumstances.
Such a presumption is often unwarranted and would also likely violate
international law under Berne. 63
'
This Article proposes to turn this presumption on its head. Rather than
presume orphanhood from a certain set of circumstances, the law should
presume non-orphanhood from a different set of circumstances, namely
submission of the work into the voluntary registry. Unlike the proposals
discussed above, this presumption would be a positive benefit attached to
an act rather than a loss of right attached to an omission. Non-registration
would not result in any loss of protection, but rather only forbearance of
a possible benefit. While a presumption favoring orphanhood for failure
to register would likely fail as an impermissible formality,"6 the reverse
presumption against orphanhood would be an enhancement of copyright
protection allowed under Berne.
It must be noted that the presumption against orhpanhood would be
rebuttable. Particular users who conduct a reasonable search, including a

Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive
notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if-(1) the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to
which it pertains so that, after the document is indexed by the Register of
Copyrights, it would be revealed by a reasonable search under the title or
registration number of the work; and
(2) registration has been made for the work.

163. See Recording Artists Comment, supra note 59, at 5 ("there should be no presumption
that a work has entered into a period in which it can be recognized as an orphan work. Such
presumption is not warranted and may impose unwanted formalities.").
164. See July 27, 2005 Orphan Works Roundtable, at 113, availableat http://www.copyright.
gov/orphan/transcript/0727LOC.PDF (noting that defining orphanhood by failure to register would
"de facto raise international formalities issues, in the sense that as a matter of practice someone,
an author for example, would essentially have to register in one of these so-called voluntary
registries in order to forestall an orphan works designation, and the limitations and remedies that
it might entail...").
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search of the registry, and fail to find the desired information would have
the ability to argue that facts particular to the situation warrant reversal of
the presumption. The rebuttable presumption would therefore serve as a
catchall for the drawbacks of the registry discussed above.'6 5 Problems
with searchability of photographs, the high cost and low chance of finding
a particular work, and other concerns would be addressed in determining
whether, in a particular case, the presumption should be rebutted.'66 But,
because a user would have the burden of rebutting the presumption, the
copyright owner would have an advantage and therefore an incentive to
voluntarily register the work.
V. CONCLUSION

The problem of orphan works poses a serious threat to creativity and
to the objectives of copyright protection. Many solutions have been
proposed, but most fail to get to the root of the problem. A proper solution
does all it can to bring potential users and copyright owners into contact
with one another to negotiate an efficient, mutually beneficial
arrangement. The best way to achieve this objective is to create incentives
for users to find owners, and for owners to be found. The combination of
a reasonable efforts requirement, a voluntary registry, and a presumption
against orphanhood for works submitted to the registry makes for an
efficient solution which complies with the requirements of domestic and
international law. With a proper functioning registry and incentives on
both sides to make use of it, we will get a little closer to solving the orphan
works problem and at the same time help to ensure that new works are
created, old works are preserved, and the well of creativity will not run
dry.

165. See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
166. For example, owner information for an old photograph of a common landscape may
prove difficult to retrieve in the registry after a lengthy search. The user may deem this search
reasonable and use the work assuming it has been orphaned because it was not found in the registry.
In an action for copyright infringement, the owner of the photograph would enjoy the benefit of the
presumption against orphanhood which comes with submission to the registry. The user, however,
would have the opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence of facts particular to this
photograph such as its age, its common subject matter, and other facts which make the work
difficult to find even if properly submitted to the registry.
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